Abstract
This article is a follow-up to an article I published in this newspaper in 2017. In 2017, I tried to make forward-looking predictions from the perspective of game-changing technologies in future Naval War Systems. I will strive to focus primarily on future forecasts in this essay while touching on the progress made since that first article I considered as a starting point.
Introduction
Game-changing technologies, as the name suggests, fundamentally shift the balance of power in a given field when applied appropriately (Fitzgerald B., Sayler K., and Brimley S., 2013, p. 11). Such technologies exhibit two main characteristics. Firstly, they render the existing policies, strategies, concepts, doctrines, and organizations of all players obsolete, thus exhibiting a disruptive nature. Secondly, they depart significantly from the prevailing theoretical framework or the dominant paradigm, creating a new path.
In this context, I'd like to present several key ideas that inform the theme of this article:
1. The traditional 20-year timeframe for planning and developing naval warfare capabilities has drastically shortened to just five years.
2. Over the next five years, one third of the main components of large naval forces will consist of submersible, floating, and flying unmanned platforms.
3. Existing concepts and doctrines that govern everything from reconnaissance to unrestricted naval warfare for sea control have been rendered obsolete, particularly due to new generation unmanned platforms. Consequently, they will need to be rewritten.
These viewpoints are certainly not immune to criticism, which is fully warranted. This article is meant to spark intellectual discourse between the following criticisms and the positions I've outlined:
1. The idea of a five-year long-term plan is perhaps unrealistic.
2. It's unlikely that budget programming can be completed in five years.
3. The prediction that one-third of large navies will be composed of unmanned systems is quite ambitious.
4. Despite the presence of advanced systems in world navies, shipbuilding projects continue to grow.
5. While unmanned systems undoubtedly make substantial contributions to operations, I don't believe that manned systems will proliferate to such an extent.
The past five years
The predicted revolution in naval warfare was believed to rest on the shoulders of unmanned vehicles. Among them, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) were considered the standout innovation that would shift the tides of conflict. This wasn't a new hypothesis – the idea that the crux of naval battles could hinge on undersea prowess had long been mooted. Yet, the envisioned evolution in this field hasn't unfolded as rapidly as predicted over the past half-decade, due largely to a variety of obstacles such as underwater communication challenges, high resource requirements, and technological difficulties inherent to subaqueous environments.
During this period, unmanned vehicles designed for above-water operation have made a larger splash, attracting significantly more investment. However, I don't foresee this trend persisting indefinitely. Underwater platforms, particularly those focused on smaller, unmanned submarines, are gradually and consistently shifting course, even if at a slower pace.
Directed energy weapons, once highly anticipated, have failed to live up to the forecasts of the past five years. They've found their way onto a handful of platforms but haven't reached the widespread adoption that was once envisioned.
The prediction that guided projectiles would overshadow traditional cannons is still holding true, with an increased focus on lighter, cheaper guided ammunition. The integration of conventional weapons with precision guidance kits is becoming increasingly prominent. We are witnessing ongoing progress in this arena, fueled by advancements in various fuel and propulsion technologies. In simple terms, we could anticipate weapons flying at hypersonic speeds and precision strikes taking center stage in the future.
In the realm of artillery, intelligent, cost-effective rounds are on the rise as feasible alternatives to guided bullets. However, it must be noted that the industrial production capacity in this area significantly lags behind the demand.
Finally, the need to develop underwater sensors far exceeds that of above-water sensors. A greater diversity of these sensors is urgently needed. The underwater realm now presents more complex challenges than simply locating submarines or identifying mines. The requirement to safeguard energy lines and information infrastructures underwater, or broadly speaking, the imperative to protect subaqueous assets and infrastructure, has escalated considerably over the past five years.
Assessments for the upcoming period
Modern naval forces need to bolster their abilities for deterrence, defense, and maintaining a forward presence. Over the next five years, those that take a holistic approach to unmanned systems will find themselves better positioned to achieve these goals. Here, I must stress an important distinction: developing unmanned systems does not equate to adopting a comprehensive perspective on unmanned systems. This nuance is crucial.
As per NATO's Strategic Concept of 2022, the responsibilities of a robust, modern NATO navy are defined as follows: deterrence, prioritizing defense, crisis prevention and management, cooperative security, maintaining high operational readiness on all fronts, and establishing a constant presence in relevant maritime regions from peacetime onward.
Moreover, technological innovations are fundamentally altering the nature of naval warfare. New underwater sensors, paired with comprehensive land, air, and space-based surveillance capabilities, are making the frontline increasingly recognizable and transparent. Artificial intelligence-supported systems can interpret complex information patterns from the copious data they gather, allowing command and control systems to construct comprehensive situational pictures. Consequently, we can now discuss not only trace fusion but also identity fusion and intention fusion.
That being said, the sources of information are no longer confined to military systems. For instance, it's entirely possible to learn about a Russian frigate firing a Zircon hypersonic missile from a random YouTube video. When planning an offensive or defensive strategy against high-performance weapons systems, which are incredibly challenging to counteract, we must avoid putting our soldiers' lives at risk whenever possible. This is why modern navies will increasingly rely on networked unmanned systems.
The most urgent need is to develop a continually updated, accurate, common operational picture of all activities in the operational zones. It's especially vital to promptly detect and assess any anomalies or hostile intentions. The importance of this capability in terms of situational awareness at both the national and alliance levels is undoubted. I must stress, though, that assuming many navies currently possess this capability at a national or alliance level would be overly optimistic.
I want to underscore that the common operational picture for joint operations needs to be constructed in the air, on water, and underwater. This task must be performed consistently and from times of peace onwards. Systems offering this capability, whether national or alliance-based, must demonstrate extraordinary resilience and versatility, with structural, functional, and institutional redundancies. It's also essential to incorporate redundancy concepts into doctrines about the delegation of authority and distribution of responsibility to be prepared for the failure of centralized systems.
Required measures Sea Presence: This serves as a crucial demonstration of political will. It's costly, acts as a deterrent, and signifies a commitment to alliance solidarity and combat readiness. Presence also considerably enhances situational awareness in the operational theater and significantly boosts the response capabilities and speed of naval forces at sea. To maintain this critical asset more cost-effectively, modern, effective navies should consider the use of unmanned platforms at sea as a significant paradigm shift. Given the expanding challenges and responsibilities today, navies can't sustain a necessary sea presence using only their existing or planned manned platforms.
Sea-Based Attacks: Attacks from sea to shore limit an adversary's options. They primarily target command and control centers, sensor and weapon stations, and logistics hubs. Area denial capabilities are vital for securely safeguarding maritime trade routes in pertinent regions. Modern navies will require a sufficient fleet of surface and subsea platforms that are swift, hard to detect, and preferably unmanned to provide this capability. Nations shouldn't be expected to openly disclose their capacities in this context or cooperate deeply, even amongst allies. Each navy should have the ability to independently secure its own solution.
Surface Warfare: Surface warfare involves detecting, identifying, and reacting to surface and airborne targets. This foundational tactic to prevent an adversary from utilizing a marine area is a top priority for every naval force. The alliance countries possess varying skill sets in this kind of warfare, which is also crucial for safeguarding maritime trade routes. To effectively engage in this type of warfare, all navies require long-range sensor systems for compiling a defined naval picture, space-based surveillance capabilities, surface warfare platforms (both seaborne and airborne), as well as the defensive and offensive weapon systems they carry.
Underwater Warfare: Underwater warfare is becoming increasingly significant. Contrary to all modern navies' usual conduct and reflexes, basic naval warfare may have to be considered underwater warfare going forward. It's not feasible for high-value surface units (excluding unmanned ones) to operate in the open sea, exposed, from peacetime onwards. It's risky and inefficient. Modern submarines and other subsea warfare vehicles can inflict considerable damage even during peacetime. Identifying the perpetrator of underwater attacks on civilian and military targets with certainty, attributing responsibility, and holding them accountable is nearly impossible. Picture a MAYTOR (a torpedo acting like a mine) lying dormant along target deployment routes, ready to awaken and strike when detecting a target. How could we identify the owner of such a torpedo? For underwater warfare, all modern navies require modern underwater sensor networks, both stationary and mobile, an underwater defined sea picture, artificial intelligence support for its evaluation, as well as defensive and offensive weapon systems and manned and unmanned submarines for underwater warfare.
Coastal and Shallow Water Operations: The coasts of allied countries can also be targets for amphibious assaults. In such cases, the threat reaches the coast intended for defense. Geography dictates that all coasts within an adversary's amphibious range must be secured. Coastal defense begins with a presence there from peacetime onward. This defense requires control of the coastal approach waters from the sea along the entire allied coast, coastal defense infantry, and special forces on the coast. Another critical defense strategy is to be strong and effective in amphibious assaults from our coast to the opposing (hostile) coast. In this field, unmanned surface and underwater vehicles will serve both as a deterrent against high-value power-projecting elements and as essential tools in the frontline operations of our forces.
Developing comprehensive naval command and control systems
A thoroughly defined maritime landscape encompassing surface, sub-surface, coastal, and aerial aspects is an essential prerequisite for executing any type of warfare. This critical objective is achieved through collaboration and expertise, involving both military and civilian authorities at national and international levels. As this information is disseminated across authorized networks, the effectiveness and efficiency of both national and allied naval warfare is expected to increase.
To accomplish this mission, all allied navies will require manned and unmanned platforms for continuous data collection. Establishing cooperative relationships with institutions within and outside naval forces, civilian authorities, organizations, and the maritime industry to share information is crucial. Navies will need trained personnel, standardized networks for data exchange, and the implementation of artificial intelligence technology for data analysis.
Preparing for these tasks implies a fundamental shift in naval strategy, requiring the dismantling of outdated concepts and doctrines. For instance, are we prepared to construct war clouds, house fusion in unconventional civilian data centers, utilize AI robots on real-time data, or delegate tactical control of a task force at sea to a virtual commodore avatar online?
Moreover, decision support systems will be built upon this foundational data. In the past, predicting the attitudes, decisions, behaviors, and reflexes of a neighboring commander was relatively simple, given the shared training and concepts. However, consider a scenario where a virtual commodore, trained through artificial intelligence, commands a mixed unit of human and non-human components in your adjacent area. As you work together towards military objectives, how would you navigate without being able to predict their attitudes, decisions, behaviors, and reflexes? It's time to rethink our strategies in the light of evolving AI technology and the shifting dynamics of warfare.
Conclusion
Yes, in this piece, I've primarily linked my predictions for the future of naval warfare to unmanned warships. Let me briefly explain the reasoning behind this deliberate choice. Beyond the prediction that modern navies will trend towards unmanned vessels in significant numbers and at a relatively rapid pace, there's a second factor motivating me that I believe is equally important. The earlier a navy incorporates unmanned warships into its ingrained concepts and doctrines, the more it stands to gain from this shift. I'm not referring to a quantitative edge, but a qualitative advantage in application. Instead of years of costly capability enhancements, it's possible to integrate unmanned and manned platforms in a simple and familiar way. Both national and allied navies are confronting the integration of unmanned platforms into the existing navy with trepidation and high costs. They're preparing for a deep dive into the transformation of new standards and technological infrastructure. However, it's worth noting this paradox: before embarking on excessive investments and processes, it's crucial to focus on the following fundamental points.
Existing command centers and headquarters can tackle this task with minimal modifications. Existing tactical data links (TVLs) can satisfy about 85% of the information exchange requirements of unmanned and remote-controlled warships, enabling all TVL-equipped units— whether they're afloat, airborne, underwater, or based on land—to interact directly with unmanned platforms without needing any modernization. We should use the widest array of TVL standard definitions that we've been developing for the past 40 years in unmanned platforms. However, this does not mean every unmanned platform must be equipped with TVL systems. Where the role of unmanned warships in combat is unclear, we can start by examining how similar core warfare capabilities are performed on manned platforms.
The benefits offered by unmanned warships, such as decreased risks, enduring and widespread sea presence, deterrence, national security impact delivery at a lower per-unit cost, and exceptionally short acquisition times, can only remain appealing to modern navies through a straightforward integration path, as described above. Otherwise, we're doomed to witness an endlessly extending narrative of serial capability transformation.
In conclusion, I'm convinced that modern navies will be highly attentive to the unique operational challenges posed by unmanned warships, such as their legal status, self-defense capabilities, support, and maintenance, before they materialize into large-scale procurement projects. It's crucial to start preparing and assimilating operational concepts (CONOPS) for unmanned warships as soon as possible.
Unmanned warship capabilities can span a wide range of sizes and functions, from small reconnaissance or oceanographic surveillance to larger corvette-sized ships designed for defensive and offensive operations. As we navigate the current era of competition, there will be much more to examine, research, and learn about these capabilities as their applications expand. I wish you all the best with your virtual commodore who, despite not being a Naval Academy graduate but rather a product of land-based test infrastructures and research centers, whose seniority won't be determined by their graduation year, and who may even command more respect due to their superior abilities. It appears the ship under the guidance of a virtual commodore who automatically takes the lead will also need to learn to automatically Close up flag GOLF.
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