Turkish Navy: A sine qua non for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean

MDN İstanbul

Adm. (Ret.) Cem Gürdeniz

KUDENFOR Director Adm. (Ret.) Cem Gürdeniz evaluated Turkish Navy’s importance in the Eastern Mediterranean for MarineDeal News readers: ‘Turkey’s defense, security and welfare depend on the three seas that surround it and the solidity of its sea power’

Countries have different geographical features which dictate not only the their fate but also that of others. Turkey is located in a very sensitive region where ongoing conflicts have different dimensions under the ever-changing geopolitical landscape of Eurasia. Recent conflicts and developments suggest that the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean are and will continue to be one of the main focuses of world politics as they have been throughout the centuries. During the cold war, this region was one of the main centers of gravity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO as the Atlantic system which strived to contain Soviet Union from expanding into the south. Following the demise of the Soviet Union and commencement of the unipolar world order under the victorious West, the Mediterranean became a hot spot for new border drawings, starting first with Yugoslavia in the 1990’s and continuing with Libya and Syria in 2011 and 2013 respectively.

Although the Mediterranean covers only one percent of the world oceans and seas, the existence of Strait of Gibraltar, Turkish Straits and Suez Canal gives this sea a unique strategic importance related to seaborne trade. 4000 merchant ships ply its waters everyday. It is adjacent to the Middle East, which has almost 45 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas reserves. The sea itself has oil and gas reservoirs as well. After the dawn of the 21st century the seabed hydrocarbons and rare earth metal deposits of the eastern Mediterranean created a geopolitical and geo-economic motivation similar to the gold rush in the Wild West.

Turkey, as a crossroad between Europe; Asia and Africa, lies along an east-to-west axis on a peninsular geography neighboring Russian, Persian, Greek and Arabian cultural spheres. This also means that Turkey is at a center where complex interests and cultural effects are intermingled.

Turkish Straits add a special importance to Turkey. Since the 17th century, the straits have been the centerpiece of geopolitics and strategy. As Gibraltar’s east-west and the Suez Channel’s north-south access to the Mediterranean, the Turkish straits give Black Sea littorals and world shipping access to the Mediterranean Sea and vice versa. By virtue of the Montreux Convention (1936), Turkey has overall control over the passage from the straits during peace and war times. This convention not only provides a set of regulations concerning the passage but a unique maritime security regime through its limitations in the Black Sea. With more than 120 ships (of which 25 are oil tankers) passing through the straits each day, they are also the life lines of the Russian economy. Almost 60 percent of the Russian overseas trade pass through the Turkish Straits.

Turkey, which is surrounded by three seas — the Black Sea in the north, the Mediterranean in the south and the Aegean in the west — has a coastline of 4433 nautical miles, which is three times more than its land boundaries. This creates a different perspective from which Turkey should be viewed as a maritime state. Its defense, security and welfare depend on these three seas. In order to understand the significance of the seas for Turkey, it would not be wrong to have a quick glance at the long history of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey.

During the Ottoman Empire era, when the fleet was strong, land battles were won with great success. The rise of the Ottoman Empire continued with the rise of the Ottoman Fleet. However this rise could not have triggered the expansion of the imperial sea control outside of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. They never reached the status of ‘’global reach, global power’’. On the other hand after the early 17th century Ottoman Sultans began to neglect the fleet in parallel with an overall decline in Ottoman technology, which caused a dramatic weakening in the Empire’s sea power. That deterioration triggered the fall of the Empire. With the lessons learned from history, the young Republic of Turkey has not permitted history to repeat itself. The founder of the Republican Fleet, Atatürk, established its theory and practice. In keeping with Atatürk’s famous quote, “The objective is to have a perfect and capable fleet,” the Turkish Navy took its place as a major part of the nation’s frontlines of defense.

Starting from scratch with very few obsolete battleships, battlecruisers, and several others; reorganization in every area of naval activities started in 1923 with the declaration of the Republic. In 1924, the Naval Ministry was established as an independent body from the General Staff. The majority of the existing obsolete fleet was discarded and new acquisitions including five new submarines, four new destroyers and three patrol boats revitalized the fleet already with a new spirit. The repair of battlecruiser Yavuz at the newly established Gölcük Shipyard boosted the existing firepower.

Turkey maintained its neutrality during World War II, but the Naval Forces were alerted and mobilized against a possible hostile act in territorial and adjacent waters. In 1946, a major stalemate between the Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union emerged following the Soviet Notes. The Soviets demanded amendments to the Montreux Convention; which marked a milestone in the formulation of a new policy toward the Western sphere of influence. Thus Turkey left the Kemalist legacy of nonalignment and independence.

Turkey entered NATO in 1952 and this event brought many radical changes within. The doctrine of the Navy, was rearranged and Turkey was made responsible for only the Black Sea region leaving the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean to Greece. Until the Bloody Christmas of 1963 in Cyprus when Turkish nationals were massacred, the Turkish Navy was distant to the Eastern Mediterranean due to its NATO commitments. Makarios, then the cleric-president of Cyprus, triggered the awakening of Turkish maritime geopolitics toward the Mediterranean through his clear actions and intentions of ethnic cleansing against Turkish people. Turkish Navy’s and other services amphibious operations on 20 July 1974 at the shores of Girne (Kyrenia) of Cyprus provided the major strategic push for the Turkish armed forces against Nikos Sampson coup, thus preventing the possible annihilation of the Cypriot Turks. The unjust arms embargo imposed by USA against Turkey after the Cyprus intervention has prompted the birth of indigenous Turkish defense industry.

A similar geopolitical move came in 1974 when Greece unilaterally started seismic research in the Aegean high seas followed by the militarization of the Aegean Islands. Aegean Sea became the main center of gravity for the Turkish Navy then.

When the cold war ended in 1989, Turkish Soviet relations had much better record in the last 40 years compared to those with Greece and Greek Cypriots. The existing Aegean flash points with Greece starting after the Cyprus Peace Operations and Continental Shelf conflict of 1974 became the main stimulant for the rise of Turkish Navy, prioritizing combat readiness and force superiority against Greece over the NATO commitments towards Soviets.

During the years between 1989 and 2001 Turkey has witnessed the massacres of its kin in the Balkans, mainly in Bosnia Herzegovina. The disappointment and resentment from the new world order with new security concerns both national and international, necessitated the new posturing of the Turkish Navy with not only with new force and command structure but strategy and doctrine. Thus Turkish Navy entered into 21st century with new energy and mindset, which directed the fleet towards the blue waters. Operations in Somalia for UN missions as well participation in NATO’s maritime operations at Adriatic coincided with the national operations within nonconventional maritime tasks spectrum such as anti/counter terrorism, disaster relief and non combatant evacuation operations. The post cold war era has also necessitated a more robust posture in Aegean Sea to deal with existing bilateral conflicting issues with Greece mainly after Kardak Rocks Crisis of 1996. The Marmara earthquake of 1999 has prompted the major deployment as well command structure changes making Turkish Fleet more robust and flexible in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, thanks to Aksaz Naval Base.

The early years of new millennium saw the rise of Eastern Mediterranean as a new center of gravity for the Turkish Navy, following the Greek Cypriots challenges against potential Turkish Mediterranean EEZ which prompted Turkish Navy to establish permanent maritime security operations named Mediterranean Shield in spring of 2006. Those early years of 21st century have also witnessed the high profile stand of the Turkish Navy to establish Confidence Building as well as maritime security initiatives in the Blacksea under the Aegis of Montreux Convention. First came the BLACKSEAFOR, (Blacksea Naval Cooperation Task Group) in 2001, followed by Operation Blacksea Harmony in 2004, a maritime security operation in lieu of NATO’s Active Endeavor Operations in the Mediterranean Sea commenced after 9/11. Border and Coast Guards Cooperation Forum of 2006 was the last initiative led by Turkey in the area. Turkey set an unprecedented example to the world not only in CSBM (Confidence and Security Building Measures) field but also capacity building for the littoral navies. This era has also provided the most dramatic elevation of national naval armament programs, which was led by MILGEM (National Ship Project) as well GENESIS Combat Management System Software with many other sensor and weapon systems, indigenous development projects. Today not only Navy’s own shipbuilding capabilities but also those of the Turkish marine industry continue to develop defense industry in ever increasing tempo with maximum nationally manufactured/procured items in a large spectrum.

Turkish Navy has suffered a lot from the rigged bogus cases such as Balyoz (Sledgehammer), Ergenekon and so-called Istanbul and Izmir Espionage cases starting 2007 under the FETO orchestration and then government approval. That period resulted with the loss of crème de la crème cadres, which were filled by the Gulenist admirals and officers. This massive purge paved the way to 15 July 2016 Coup Attempt under the Gulenists direction. This unsuccessful coup later provided Turkish Navy to sanitize itself from those Gulenists and their affiliates. Today Turkish Navy operates with less manpower however with clear conscious. The Fleet against all odds has achieved and continues the maintenance of its firepower and maneuver capabilities.

Today it continues to protect and safeguard Turkish maritime interests in the surrounding seas i.e. ‘’Blue Homeland’’ whilst maintaining its permanent presence in the Arabian Sea as part of the anti piracy operations. Having more confident cadres after the massive purging of Gulenists, the Navy today strives to fulfill its commitments and contributions to Turkey’s maritime geopolitics centered on 4 main objectives.

  • To maintain the Montreux Regime and status quo in the Black Sea
  • To protect, safeguard and develop Turkish maritime interests against Greek/Greek Cypriots and/or other nations/organizations claims and faits-accomplis in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Seas.
  • To support TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) maritime interests whilst contributing to the Turkey’s responsibilities to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in the Island.
  • To enable uninterrupted flow of Turkish seaborne trade in regional and global scale.

We know that a strong Turkish Navy is a major guarantor to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean seas. This is why President Venizelos paid his first visit to Kemal Ataturk when Turkish Battlecruiser Yavuz was repaired and sailed in the Aegean in 1930. History has taught us that a strong Turkish Fleet has always deterred Greek passions which were never aligned with its capabilities. It should not be forgotten that Turkish Amphibious troops secured the beachhead at Girne on 20th July 1974 afternoon, which is solely 120 hours after the Nikos Sampson Coup against Makarios. That is an unprecedented record short time for a nation whose last naval battle was fought in 1913.

Since 1974 no bloodshed occured on the Island. If the Turkish Navy were weakened in the Eastern Mediterranean or Turkish Army Corps were withdrawn from the TRNC, without a doubt bloodshed would be inevitable based on Greek animosity against Turks and past experiences.

Turkey historically knows and recognizes the fact that in the event of a decline in Turkey’s seapower, Anatolia loses geopolitically. Today’s geopolitical landscape forces Turkey to assert vigilance and a proactive attitude against emerging risks and threats to its geopolitical maritime interests. There is no doubt that Turkey would not permit any act paving the way for an independent Kurdistan with a free access to Mediterranean Sea. Similarly Turkey would never let any act of infringement to its non-declared exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Mediterranean. Zero tolerance to any expansion of the Greek territorial sea width as well as unilateral declaration of a continental shelf or EEZ in the Aegean Sea should be added to this list, as they represent zero-sum-game issues for Turkish geopolitics. On the other hand a strong Turkish Navy, capable of deterring any Greek or Greek Cypriot adventures and/or faits accomplis in the Aegean and Mediterranean will continue to prevent war through readiness with a robust and resilient national defense industry. Let us continue to assume that neither Greeks nor Greek Cypriots would repeat their past mistakes, which resulted in their strategic humiliation.

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